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Financial institutions and Markets
iMPact oF u.s. Financial and econoMic distress on soutH korea
By Thomas F. Cargill
introduction
Korea’s economy in 2008 was adversely impacted 
by high commodity prices, especially oil, and by 
financial and real shocks started by the collapse of 
housing prices in the United States and subsequent 
economic and financial distress that rapidly spread 
throughout much of the world. Commodity prices 
have declined, but the continuing economic and 
financial distress in the United States will continue 
to impact Korea. Korea’s exports have declined 
significantly in the last few months, the economy 
slowed and in 2008:4 gross domestic product de-
clined by 3.4 percent, and government policymakers 
will face a number of macroeconomic and financial 
stability issues in the next few years. Nonetheless, 
Korea’s economy to date has absorbed the shocks 
without the degree of distress exhibited in late 1997 
and 1998. Although Korea continues to face major 
long-run challenges, as outlined by the most recent 
OECD economic survey of Korea,1 Korea’s flexibil-
ity in dealing with the current distress illustrates how 
much progress has been achieved since 1997–98. 
Not only has the Korean economy absorbed the 
current shocks without intense distress, but the 
commitment toward continued reform exhibited by 
Korean authorities provides a foundation for deal-
ing with the longer-run challenges. This cautiously 
optimistic view needs to be conditioned, however, 
by the fact the Korean economy is declining much 
faster than anticipated; and how Korea adapts to 
the economic and financial distress is dependent 
on factors outside of its control because of Korea’s 
heavy reliance on exports.
This paper assesses the impact of the U.S. economic 
and financial distress on Korea from both a short- 
and long-run perspective. The next section discusses 
the U.S. situation in the context of a less-than-
smooth liberalization process that has been ongoing 
since the 1970s throughout much of the world. This 
provides a broad historical perspective. Then Ko-
rea’s past efforts in dealing with its own economic 
and financial distress are discussed; this provides 
a Korean historical perspective. The next section 
outlines the channels of how the U.S. financial crisis 
impacts Korea’s economy and financial system; 
this is followed by a section that assesses the abil-
ity of the Korean economy and financial system to 
absorb the financial shock. Because the U.S. crisis 
is the direct result of the burst of the asset bubble in 
housing prices, the housing price situation in Korea 
is then reviewed and an assessment is made about 
whether Korea can anticipate the type of problems 
that plague the United States currently or affected 
Japan in the 1980s. The following section discusses 
the longer-term impact the crisis will have on Ko-
rea’s growth strategy and reform program. A short 
concluding section ends the paper.
the current u.s. Financial distress in 
Historical context
During the past three decades the economic and 
even in some cases political institutions in a wide 
range of countries experienced a major transition 
toward more open, transparent, and less collectivist 
structures compared with the first decades of the 
postwar period. In the context of economic institu-
tional redesign, the transition has been referred to 
as “deregulation,” “liberalization,” “international-
ization,” or “democratization” of economic institu-
tions. The transition has taken place in both the real 
and financial sectors; however, in most cases the 
1. OECD Economic Surveys: Korea (Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, December 2008).
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financial system initiated the transition.2 As financial 
liberalization became an ongoing process, it spread 
to the rest of the economy. Asian countries including 
China, Korea, and Japan have been a prominent part 
of the transition.
The transition process has not been smooth, how-
ever, especially in the financial sector. In 1996 an 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) study tabulated 
133 significant banking sector problems among the 
IMF’s 188 members from 1980 to 1996.3 The IMF 
study did not include the full extent of the Korean 
and Japanese financial problems that brought these 
countries close to collapse in 1998, nor did it include 
the Asian financial crisis of 1997. Despite these 
cases of financial distress, however, the majority 
of countries continued with the liberalization of 
economic and financial institutions, and Korea 
recovered by 2000 and Japan by 2005 while China 
and India continued to grow as they opened up 
markets.
The recent events unfolding in the United States 
shocked the world because of the intensity of the 
distress and how rapidly the distress spread. The 
collapse of housing prices, recognition of nonper-
forming mortgage loans, collapse of secondary 
markets, failures of major financial institutions, and 
unprecedented efforts by the U.S. government to 
limit distress add up to a sharp reversal of progress 
made during the past three decades. Although the 
crisis environment that dominated September and 
October 2008 has subsided, the U.S. economy has 
been in recession since December 2007, balance 
sheets of financial institutions remain weak, and the 
economic and financial distress is global.
The origins of the U.S. distress can be found in 
the interaction of a destabilizing interrelationship 
among monetary policy, government support of the 
social contract with the U.S. population to support 
homeownership in general, a political decision to 
provide mortgage funds to low-to-moderate-income 
borrowers, and lax and imprudent regulation and 
supervision on the part of all major financial regula-
tory agencies. Events in the United States are still 
unfolding, and it is unclear how long the financial 
and economic distress will continue. Many of the 
same elements that prolonged resolution of the 
economic and financial distress in Japan for almost 
15 years are present in the United States. A great 
deal depends on how government policy responds 
to the distress.
The events in the United States have a profound 
impact on the world in general and on Korea in 
particular. First, financial distress and recession in 
the United States adversely impact trade and espe-
cially trade with economies such as China, Korea, 
and Japan that are driven by an export-oriented 
growth strategy. A sharp slowdown or decline in 
exports will generate economic and financial stress 
in a wide range of countries. Second, the intellectual 
and policy support for market liberalization start-
ing in the 1970s came from the United States. The 
United States has been an aggressive advocate of 
liberalization, especially in the financial sector, and 
successfully pressured many countries—including 
Korea, Japan, and, more recently, China—to liberal-
ize. The United States also has been the most aggres-
sive financial innovator. Much of the complexity in 
portfolio modeling, derivatives, secondary-market 
securities, credit default swaps, and leveraging 
has its origin in the United States. Distress in the 
United States combined with many other examples 
of financial distress mentioned above is likely to 
reduce enthusiasm for market reforms, at least in 
the short run.
Past shocks to the korean economy and 
lessons learned
The Korean economy has experienced three major 
shocks since starting the industrialization process 
following the end of Korean War in 1953.
2. This point is emphasized by Thomas F. Cargill and Takayuki Sakamoto, Japan since 1980 (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2008), chap. 3.
3. Carl-Johan Lindgren, Gillian Garcia, and Matthew I. Saal, Bank Soundness and Macroeconomic Policy (Washington, D.C.: 
International Monetary Fund, 1996).
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The first shock occurred in the early 1980s as a result 
of the cumulative effects of inefficient government 
control over the economy, especially in chemicals 
and heavy industry and in the banking system. The 
Korean approach to managing the economy on 
average produced reasonable outcomes through the 
1970s although with a high degree of variation. In 
the early 1980s, however, real GDP declined, trade 
deficits increased, and nonperforming loans began to 
accumulate in the state-controlled banking system. 
The government adopted a two-step liberalization 
agenda: policy from 1981 to 1988 focused on im-
proving macroeconomic performance, and, after 
macroeconomic performance improved, policy 
was directed toward liberalization of the real and 
financial sectors.
Despite a number of institutional changes, such as 
denationalization of the banking system in the early 
1980s, initiation of interest deregulation in 1988, 
and further interest rate deregulation policies in 
1991–92 designed to completely phase out inter-
est rate ceilings by 1997, the pace of liberalization 
was incomplete and flawed. The financial system 
was fundamentally weak and remained susceptible 
to a domestic or international shock despite the 
government reforms. In particular, international 
concern was expressed about the large nonperform-
ing loan problem in the banking system, which was 
estimated at 10 to 20 percent of loans; the heavy 
influence of the Ministry of Finance in allocating 
bank credit to client industries and influence over 
central bank policy; the heavy reliance on external 
funding (dollars) to support domestic lending; and 
a politically sensitive financial regulatory system 
lacking transparency. These concerns were ignored 
by the Korean government until the second shock 
occurred in late 1997.
Slower growth in 1996 and 1997 and the Asian 
financial crisis in 1997 exposed the weak financial 
structure and led to rapid won depreciation. Regu-
latory authorities had paid insufficient attention to 
the degree banks and nonbank institutions were 
dependent on foreign borrowing and to the increas-
ing weak balance sheets of the major chaebol. The 
won depreciated rapidly in the face of increasing 
capital flight as the Asian financial crisis spread. The 
Bank of Korea’s international reserve assets were 
insufficient to even slow the depreciation. Korea 
came close to a complete economic and financial 
collapse by the end of 1997. Real GDP declined by 
8 percent from 1997:4 to 1998:4. Korea was forced 
to seek the assistance of the IMF with the promise 
of an austerity program to prevent further won 
depreciation and a promise to accelerate reform in 
the financial system, corporate governance, and the 
chaebol. The reform process proceeded on a broad 
front,4 and macroeconomic activity recovered after 
1999. This was a major turning point in the structure 
of the Korean economy.
The third and least intense shock occurred in 2003. 
Korea reduced reliance on foreign borrowing to 
stimulate domestic spending after 1997; however, 
domestic credit expansion, especially for consumer 
spending, was substituted as a demand driver. The 
government encouraged banks to expand credit to 
businesses and consumers and provided tax incen-
tives to consumers for making payments by credit 
cards.5 Consumer credit card use and credit card debt 
expanded rapidly, and household debt increased to 
more than 70 percent of GDP compared with 40 
percent in the past. In the past, irrational business 
credit expansion through the government-controlled 
banking system generated financial distress, and in 
2002 and 2003 irrational consumer credit expansion 
encouraged by the government through a much less 
government-controlled financial system was the 
problem. The credit expansion burst in 2003, slow-
ing GDP growth from 7.0 percent to 3.1 percent, 
and the government was forced to bail out credit 
card companies. The financial system stabilized, 
and the economy recovered and continued to grow 
after 2003.
4. Thomas Byrne, “The Post-Crisis Transformation of Korea’s Banking System,” Korea’s Economy 2005 21:9–12; Thomas 
F. Cargill and Hugh Patrick, “Responses to Financial and Economic Distress in Korea and Japan,” Korea’s Economy 2005 
21:17–22.
5. Diego Valderrama, “After the Asian Financial Crisis: Can Rapid Credit Expansion Sustain Growth?” FRBSF Economic 
Letter (Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco), no. 2004–38, 24 December 2004, www.frbsf.org/publications/economics/
letter/2004/el2004-38.pdf.
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The three shocks—especially events in 1997 and 
2003—significantly influenced financial policy in 
Korea in at least five ways.
• The establishment of the Financial Supervisory 
Commission (FSC) in 1998 and the Financial 
Supervisory Service (FSS) in 1999 provided pru-
dent regulation of the financial system, reduced 
the politicalization of bank credit allocation, and 
increased overall financial system transparency.
• The Bank of Korea’s enhanced formal inde-
pendence and reliance on an inflation-targeting 
framework established a basis for price-stabiliz-
ing central bank policy and reduced the political 
influence on central bank credit allocation poli-
cies.
• The restructuring of the banking system after 
1997 and a large government infusion of capital 
generated in most cases a sound banking system 
with improved capital-asset ratios, improved 
return on assets, and dramatic decline in non-
performing loans. Korean banks emerged from 
the process more balanced, they rely more on 
commercial-based models than previously, and 
foreign banks under foreign control have become 
a permanent and competitive part of the Korean 
financial system.6
• FSS prudential regulation limited leveraging by 
restricting loan-to-value ratios, especially for real 
estate credit.
• The Korea Deposit Insurance Corporation estab-
lished in 1996 limited systemic risk by insuring 
deposits of banks, securities companies, insur-
ance companies, merchant banks, and savings 
banks. This explicit form of government deposit 
guarantees is more transparent and less sensitive 
to political pressures than the previous implicit 
system.
The Korean economy grew at a reasonable pace 
after 2003 up to mid-2008. Part of this performance 
could be attributed to the policy responses to the 
three past shocks, especially the shock in 1997. 
Despite a general consensus, Korea’s economy 
and financial system were sound and much more 
capable of dealing with domestic or international 
shocks; however, problem areas remained. Three 
are frequently mentioned.
There is concern over the significant increase in gov-
ernment debt. Before the 1990s there was not much 
government debt, but by the end of 2005 the ratio of 
Korean government debt to GDP was 30.7 percent. 
Much of this resulted from the public infusion of 
funds into the banking system in 1998 and 1999. 
Compared with the OECD average debt-to-GDP ra-
tio of 76.9 percent, this ratio was not excessive, but, 
relative to Korea’s previous levels of government 
debt, this was a major change in the role of govern-
ment debt in the financial system. Second, although 
the major chaebol have adopted more commercial-
based corporate governance structures and improved 
productivity, there is continued concern over the 
financial condition and sustainability of small- and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). They have not 
been as aggressive as the chaebol in reforming their 
business models and increasing productivity. This 
is an issue not only for the SMEs but also for the 
banking system, as banks have a large exposure to 
SME loans. Third, demographic trends in terms of 
an aging and declining population similar to Japan’s 
will present Korea with a wide range of economic, 
social, and political challenges.
Channels of Influence on Korea’s 
economy
U.S. financial and economic distress will continue 
to impact Korea through financial and real channels 
throughout 2009 and perhaps into 2010. These are 
considered the short-term impacts. Longer-term im-
pacts fall more into a political-economy perspective 
discussed in a subsequent section.
Financial Channels
The U.S. financial distress influences Korea through 
a number of financial channels; not only are the 
financial channels numerous, they are sometimes 
opaque and complex. The more obvious include 
the following:
6. Byrne, “The Post-Crisis Transformation of Korea’s Banking System.”
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• Korean private and public financial institutions, 
households, and businesses experienced a loss 
to the extent they held investments in Merrill 
Lynch, Lehman Brothers, Freddie Mac, Fannie 
Mae, AIG, and other U.S. financial institutions 
that experienced major market value declines;
• The decline of equity and mortgaged-backed 
security prices in the United States imposed a 
loss to the extent these assets were held by Ko-
reans;
• The decline of equity and bond markets through-
out the world imposed a loss to the extent these 
were held by Koreans;
• The decline of equity and bond prices in Korea 
imposed a loss on Koreans;
• The increased uncertainty and reduced availabil-
ity of funds in the international markets tightened 
credit availability in Korea;
• The increase in the LIBOR (London Interbank 
Offered Rate) restricted Korean banks’ short-term 
access to international funds in general and dol-
lars in particular;
• The weakened balance sheets of Korean banks 
and corporations generated capital flight;
• The decline in the won increased the cost of 
servicing foreign debt;
• Portfolio losses and restricted bank credit gener-
ated problems in Korea’s real estate sector and 
among SMEs; and
• International confidence in Korea’s financial 
system and ability to absorb the financial shock 
has waned.
Real Channels
The real sector impacts are neither as numerous nor 
as opaque; in fact, there are essentially three real 
channels connecting the U.S. financial and economic 
distress to Korea’s real sector. The first two are the 
result of financial impacts above, and the third is the 
impact of the U.S. and global recession on Korea’s 
export sector.
• The reduced availability and increased cost of 
credit combined with general uncertainty reduces 
domestic spending;
• The reduced availability and increased cost of 
credit has the potential to lead to a collapse of 
the real estate sector, given the rapid increase in 
housing prices through early 2007; and
• Recession in the United States and elsewhere 
will impact Korea’s export sector and reduce 
total demand for Korean output; combined with 
the first two impacts, this increases the potential 
for Korea’s first decline in output since 1998.
Korea’s Ability to Absorb the Financial 
and real shock
Despite a 32 percent decline in the value of the won, 
a 30 percent decline in Korean equity prices from 
the first of September 2008 to the first week of De-
cember 2008, and increases in interest rates across 
a broad spectrum of assets, the Korean financial 
and real sectors to date have absorbed the shock 
without intense economic and financial distress. 
Claims made in the news media that Korea might 
experience another 1997-type collapse are greatly 
exaggerated and show little understanding of the 
significant reforms Korea has made to its financial 
system since 1997. Six factors account for this 
relatively better response to date.
First, the real sector was growing and stable prior 
to the shock. Real GDP growth had been steadily 
increasing since the slowdown in 2003 caused by 
the credit card problems. In 2007:4 and 2008:1 real 
GDP growth was 5.7 and 5.8 percent, respectively; 
however, it declined to 4.8 and 3.9 percent in 2008:2 
and 2008:3, respectively. Korea’s prospects changed 
in late 2008, however. GDP growth declined by 3.4 
percent in 2008:4. The unemployment rate in 2007 
was stable at 3 percent; however, the unemploy-
ment rate began to trend upward in 2008 and in 
January 2008 was 3.3 percent. Although the Korean 
economy was showing signs of a slowdown before 
the financial shock in September, probably as a re-
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sult of high energy prices, and while the economy 
appeared well positioned to absorb the financial and 
real shock, most observers have revised downward 
their projections of economic performance in 2009. 
The projections for Korea made in the latter part of 
2008 now appear overly optimistic given Korea’s 
performance in 2008:4. As of late 2008, the OECD 
projected Korea’s economy would decline in 2009 
to 2.7 percent and then increase to 4.2 percent in 
2010.7 This was more optimistic than some others 
suggested; for example, Moody’s Investors Ser-
vice as of October 2008 projected 2 percent GDP 
growth in 2009.8 It appears even the less optimistic 
projections made in the latter part of 2008 were too 
optimistic. Unemployment is projected to increase 
to 3.6 percent in both 2009 and 2010, according to 
the OECD. To date, the unemployment rate appears 
more in line with the OECD’s projections than GDP 
growth. Thus, Korea will not likely avoid reces-
sion and increased economic and financial distress. 
Nonetheless, Korea is now in much better condition 
than previously to deal with slower and declining 
performance.
Second, the banking system was sound and well 
positioned to absorb the shock, after having gone 
through a significant redesign in response to the 
1997 and 2003 shocks. This is probably the most 
significant achievement of government reform 
since 1997. Government-sponsored mergers, capital 
injections, and greater oversight and transparency 
provided a foundation for viable Korean banking. 
In the first part of 2008, rate of return on assets 
(0.88 percent), nonperforming loans (0.6 percent), 
delinquency rates (1.7 percent for SME loans and 
0.7 percent for household loans) and Bank for Inter-
national Settlements capital (11.4 percent of assets) 
have improved significantly over the past decade.9 
Bank exposure to mortgage-backed securities, Fan-
nie Mae, and Freddie Mac was a mere $190 million 
as of 14 October 2008, according to the FSS. Some 
news reports have suggested that Korean banks have 
relied on funding domestic lending with foreign 
borrowing; however, this is not correct, according 
to government officials. The loan-to-deposit ratio 
is around 100 when deposits are properly defined 
and domestic banks’ foreign currency liabilities are 
balanced with foreign currency assets. Thus, the 
Korean banking system is in a stronger position 
compared with a decade ago, and, although it will 
experience some decline in the quality of its balance 
sheet, there is little potential for a banking problem 
of the magnitude of the late 1990s.
Third, although the won has declined significantly 
during the past few months as a result of capital 
flight and reduced demand for exports, the improved 
foundation of the Korea banking system combined 
with significant amounts of low-risk external debt 
and large holdings of international reserves reduce 
the potential for large capital flight and a downward 
spiral of the exchange rate. At the end of June 2008, 
Korea’s external debt was $420 billion, of which 
approximately 30 percent is not subject to repay-
ment burdens because it constitutes pre–foreign 
direct investment funding, foreign exchange forward 
hedging of precontracted future cash flows, and ad-
vanced receipts for shipbuilding contracts. In 1997 
international reserves were small relative to the 
size of external debt, and much of the international 
reserve holdings was of low quality and difficult for 
outsiders to evaluate because of limited government 
transparency. In 2008 the situation is different. The 
relative size of reserves to external debt is large, 
most reserves are held in AA or better rated bonds, 
and the government is transparent about holdings 
of international reserves.
Fourth, both fiscal and monetary policy instruments 
are in a strong position to respond to the adverse 
impacts of the shock. The Korean government has 
run a fiscal surplus since 2000, and as of September 
7. “Korea,” OECD Economic Outlook: Preliminary Edition, n.d., www.oecd.org/dataoecd/6/38/20213231.pdf.
8. “South Korea’s Banking Measures Should Help Alleviate Pressures,” Special Comment, Moody’s Investors Service, October 
2008.
9. The statistics cited in this and the following sections are drawn from three sources: (1) FSS release of Governor Kim Jong-
chang’s 14 October 2008 conference call with institutional investors, (2) FSC press release of December 2008 entitled “Korea’s 
Financial Market and Economy: Resilience Amid Turbulence,” and (3) Bank of Korea Web site and statistics database.
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2008 the surplus represented 2.4 percent of GDP. 
This provides the Korean government with degrees 
of freedom to advance funds to the financial or 
real sectors of the economy, to engage in spending 
to stimulate the economy, and to reduce taxes to 
stimulate the economy. Bank of Korea policy is more 
independent and transparent and less likely to give 
in to political pressure compared with the 1990s. 
Its inflation-targeting framework adopted in 1998 
has produced a stable inflation rate on which the 
economy can anchor its inflationary expectations. 
The current consumer price index inflation target is 
3 percent plus or minus 0.5 percent, and it covers 
the period from 2007 to 2009. The inflation rate has 
generally been within the target range; however, the 
inflation rate accelerated in early 2008 as a result 
of high energy costs, and it should average approxi-
mately 5 percent for 2008. The OECD predicts that 
inflation will decline in Korea in 2009 and 2010, and 
by 2010 it should be within the current range.
Thus, fiscal policy has considerable degrees of 
freedom to deal with adverse impacts on the Korean 
economy, and Bank of Korea policy has provided 
a stable environment and has established the Bank 
as a credible central bank.
Fifth, the government response to the shock has 
been rapid and transparent. Reports released by the 
FSS and the FSC as well as monetary policy state-
ments by the Bank of Korea provide much useful 
information to assess the condition of the financial 
system and the economy. The Korean government 
has initiated a wide range of actions to maintain 
foreign confidence, to reduce the impact on the 
shock on the financial system, and to cushion the 
economy in the face of declining output. Banks are 
being required to increase capital; $100 billion of 
foreign debt owed by banks is being guaranteed 
by the government; credit will be directed toward 
SMEs to overcome short-term cash flow problems; 
tax reductions of various types are being discussed; 
and the Bank of Korea lowered the base rate from 
5.25 percent in August 2008 to 2.00 percent in early 
February 2009.
Sixth, Korea is unlikely to experience a collapse of 
housing prices as in the United States. This issue is 
discussed in detail in the following section.
Housing Prices in korea
In early 2007 a review of housing prices in Korea 
in the context of an asset bubble taxonomy sug-
gested by Minsky outlined implications for Bank 
of Korea policy and compared the potential for a 
Japan-like housing problem.10 The paper was pub-
lished just as housing prices in the United States 
were beginning to collapse, according to the S&P 
Case-Shiller national indexes; that is, house prices 
peaked in late 2006 and started to decline in 2007. 
Even as housing prices began to decline, the full 
magnitude of the problem had not emerged. The 
2007 paper concluded, “. . .increases in housing 
prices in Korea are likely not sustainable, that a 
downward adjustment is more likely than not, but 
that the problem is not near a magnitude that requires 
aggressive monetary policy at this time. Instead, 
the BOK [Bank of Korea] would do well to ‘learn 
against’ the potential housing bubble. This appears 
to be the policy currently being implemented.”11 In 
hindsight, this conclusion suggests two questions: 
First, did the pace of housing price increases slow 
in 2007 and 2008? Second, is Korea susceptible to 
a housing collapse?
Figure 1 and Figure 2 illustrate the annual percent-
age change in the housing and apartment purchase 
price index for Korea, Seoul, and southern Seoul 
from January 2000 to September 2008, respec-
tively.12 Both figures illustrate considerable price 
variation; however, only for a short period in late 
2004 and early 2005 did prices actually decline. 
In early 2007 there was concern over the rapid in-
crease in housing and apartment prices; however, 
it now appears house and apartment prices have 
10. Thomas F. Cargill and Federico Guerrero, “Bank of Korea Policy and Asset Bubbles,” Korea’s Economy 2007 23:8–18; Hyman 
P. Minsky, “The Financial Instability Hypothesis: Capitalistic Processes and the Behavior of the Economy,” in Financial Crises: 
Theory, History and Policy, ed. C. P. Kindleberger and J. P. Laffargue (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982). 
11. Cargill and Guerrero, “Bank of Korea Policy and Asset Bubbles,” 8.
12. Data were provided by the Bank of Korea.
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Figure 1: Percentage Change in the Housing Price 
Index in Korea, in Seoul, and in Southern Seoul 
January 2000–September 2008
Percentage change
Source: Bank of Korea.
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Figure 2: Percentage Change in the Apartment 
Price Index in Korea, in Seoul, and in Southern 
Seoul, January 2000–September 2008
Percentage change
Source: Bank of Korea.
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stabilized around an annual rate of approximately 
5 to 7 percent.
Three reasons account for why a housing problem 
did not materialize in Korea and is not likely to 
become a problem as it has in the United States or 
was in Japan. First, the Bank of Korea adopted a 
policy of “leaning against the housing bubble.” The 
Bank of Korea raised the base rate of 3.5 percent 
in October 2005 in several steps, to a high of 5.25 
percent in August 2007. Second, mortgage credit 
was not as large a part of the Korean economy as 
it was in the United States. The ratio of mortgage 
credit to GDP in Korea is 33.4 percent while in the 
United States the ratio is 72.3 percent. Mortgage 
delinquency rates after declining from 2004 to 2007 
increased in Korea from 2007 to 2008 to about 0.5 
percent compared with the approximate 7 percent 
delinquency rate in the United States in the latter part 
of 2008. Third, and probably most important, start-
ing in 2002 Korean regulatory authorities imposed 
significant prudential requirements on mortgage 
loans; a key component was a loan-to-value ratio 
of 40 to 60 percent and a debt-to-income ratio of 
40 percent. Had these types of regulations been 
in place in the United States, there would likely 
not have been a housing bubble and burst. The 
relatively low ratio in Korea is important because, 
even if housing prices decline, individuals would 
still retain positive equity and still have incentive to 
meet mortgage payments. Declining housing prices 
are more serious in the United States because even 
many prime mortgage loans have been made with 
low down payments and because mortgage credit is 
generally given without recourse.
Hence, Korea did have the potential of a housing 
problem in early 2007 although it was not of the 
magnitude of other countries. The pace of housing 
price increases declined and, because of stricter 
prudential requirements on mortgage credit, Korea is 
not likely to experience a housing problem as Japan 
did in the 1990s or as currently exists in the United 
States. The problem in Japan was a close interrela-
tionship among bank capital, bank lending, equity 
prices, and real estate prices not prominent in Korea. 
The problem in the United States was imprudent 
lending and borrowing that resulted in widespread 
negative equity in housing when prices began to 
decline. In both Japan and the United States the 
housing problem was exacerbated by easy monetary 
policy. This is not to claim an absence of problems 
in Korea’s housing sector: construction companies 
are overextended and a large number have declared 
bankruptcy, many apartment projects remain unsold, 
and real estate prices are likely to decline in 2009. 
In spite of this, it is unlikely housing will become 
the problem it was for Japan and currently is for the 
United States. In Japan and the United States hous-
ing was at the center of the financial and economic 
distress, while in Korea housing is responding more 
to the global slowdown than to any fundamental 
internal instability.
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long-term impact on korea
The impact of the worldwide financial distress on 
Korea to date has been more serious than anticipated 
in the latter part of 2008. Korea should be concerned, 
and, on the positive side, the Korean government 
has not been complacent, if this can be judged by its 
policy reaction to date. There is concern, however, 
that the Korean government might not fully compre-
hend the longer-run impacts likely to emerge from 
the U.S. economic and financial distress.
Henry Kaufman, in an insightful review of how 
the credit crisis will impact economic behavior in 
the United States, states that the current distress is 
the most serious threat to the financial system ex-
perienced since the 1930s. Kaufman believes also 
that, although the financial stress in terms of bank 
failures and economic distress in terms of real GDP, 
prices, and unemployment come nowhere near the 
magnitudes of the 1930s, today’s overall financial 
and economic distress is a major event in U.S. 
history and will influence long-run behavior and 
government policy.13
Of the several changes in behavior or policy out-
lined by Kaufman, the following three are the most 
relevant for Korea’s future:
• International portfolio diversification has been 
undermined;
• The era of ballooning nonfinancial debt has 
ended; and
• Americans will begin to save again.
Korea has benefited greatly from internationaliza-
tion of finance. The rapid spread of the U.S. financial 
distress to much of the world because of the inter-
nationalization of domestic portfolios combined 
with the complexity of financial asset instruments 
has raised concerns about the internationalization of 
finance. Institutional redesign will take place in the 
near future, and there is concern that governments 
might move to limit financial innovation and credit 
growth, thereby in the long run limiting Korea’s eco-
nomic potential. Kaufman notes that some redesign 
will be necessary because of lessons learned from 
the current situation, but that governments will need 
to be careful to balance the need to limit systemic 
risk with the need to allow financial innovation and 
internationalization of finance to continue.
Korea as an export-oriented economy faces an 
even more serious problem if Americans com-
mence saving and reduce debt. The United States 
since the 1980s has been on a consumption binge 
financed by credit growth. Domestic consumption 
by households, business, and government combined 
exceeded domestic production, and, as a result, the 
United States has been running increasingly large 
current account deficits until only recently, when 
the size of the deficit declined somewhat. Starting 
in 1990 the current account deficit has steadily 
increased in absolute terms and increased relative 
to GDP. In the early 1990s, the deficit represented 
about 0.25 percent of GDP; however, by 2007, the 
deficit represented about 1.2 percent of GDP. If 
Kaufman is correct and Americans begin to increase 
the saving rate and reduce reliance on credit, this 
will adversely impact any export-oriented country 
for which the United States is a large market. 
This is especially true for Korea. The percentage of 
total exports to the United States in 2004 averaged 
about 16 percent. The percentage has declined since 
2004 and as of late 2008 stood at about 10 percent. 
Korea, as well as other export-oriented economies 
such as Japan and China, is likely to see a long-term 
decline in exports to the United States if the U.S. 
saving rate increases and nonfinancial debt declines. 
These are likely events, and Korean officials might 
consider the longer-term impacts on the U.S. distress 
in this context.
In addition to a shift in economic behavior in the 
United States toward greater saving, political de-
velopments in the United States as well as in other 
industrialized countries suggest protectionist mea-
sures are more likely than at any other time during 
the past three decades. A shift toward protectionism 
13. Henry Kaufman, “How the Credit Crisis Will Change the Way America Does Business,” Wall Street Journal, 6 December 
2008.
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in the United States and elsewhere would adversely 
impact Korea’s growth potential. Korea and other 
exported-oriented economies have benefited greatly 
from the trade liberalization during the past three 
decades, but protectionism is a growing risk.
The financial distress in the United States is likely 
to change attitudes about financial liberalization in 
Korea. Prior to 1997 Korea’s financial liberalization 
process was more rhetoric than substance; however, 
the crisis in 1997 and 1998 convinced policymakers 
that the old regime needed to be redesigned. Korea 
adopted a meaningful reform process and during the 
past decade has accomplished many improvements 
in the stability of the financial system. In fact, these 
accomplishments explain much of the reason why 
the Korean economy has been able to absorb the fi-
nancial and real shocks to date. The crisis has raised 
concerns about the pace of liberalization, however, 
and how far to permit innovation, especially in 
terms of securitization. Korean officials have stated 
that current events will not detour the liberalization 
process directed toward financial institutions and 
markets, but at the same time the political economy 
context suggests that a policy of further liberaliza-
tion will be influenced by what happened, why it 
happened, and how events will evolve in 2009 and 
2010. Thus, at a minimum Korea will become a little 
more cautious in pursuing financial liberalization. 
Unlike the potential decline of the U.S. market for 
exports and shift toward protectionism, this develop-
ment may or may not be a negative.
concluding comment
The Korean financial system and economy have 
absorbed the U.S. economic and financial distress 
reasonably well compared with 1997–98. There is 
evidence that financial institution balance sheets 
are weaker, but the reforms made since 1997 and 
government reaction have reduced the potential for 
serious systemic problems. A reasonable argument 
can be made that Korea is unlikely to experience a 
housing problem of the magnitude experienced in 
Japan in the past or currently in the United States. 
In the short run, the Korean economy will decline in 
2009; Korea’s dependence of exports makes it more 
susceptible to world economic conditions that are 
largely outside of Korea’s power to influence.
In this regard, events in the United States will have 
a long-run impact on economic behavior and will 
likely reduce Korea’s market for exports to the 
United States. Given the significant importance 
of the U.S. market, this might offer another op-
portunity for Korean authorities to reconsider their 
export-oriented growth strategy. The tendency to 
blame deregulation and liberalization for the cur-
rent problems combined with the real need to make 
some institutional changes may generate policies 
that limit internationalization of finance. Korea will 
be adversely impacted. In addition, Korea’s own 
regulatory reforms may be toned down in the light 
of recent events.
Thus, Korea has absorbed the recent shocks reason-
ably well in that systemic risk has not increased 
significantly as it did in 1998. Much of this is due to 
the policy responses to the major shocks experienced 
by the Korean economy during the past decade. 
Nonetheless, the sharp decline in GDP in 2008:4, 
the sharp decline in exports, and the increase in the 
unemployment rate suggest Korea will experience 
recession and increased economic and financial 
distress in 2009. In addition, Korea continues to face 
long-run issues that have been well documented. 
The recent events in the United States introduce two 
new issues—the likely decline in the U.S. market 
for Korean exports and the potential for regulatory 
redesign to limit innovation and credit growth.
Dr. Cargill is Professor of Economics at the Uni-
versity of Nevada, Reno.
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